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Abstract: The rise of mass schooling is an important contributor to modern economic growth. 
But its form, content, scale and manner of provision are all matters of public policy that are 
subject to politics. The rise of modern schooling is frequently cast as a product of broadened 
suffrage and stronger political voice of the masses, which overcame the political opposition from 
old ruling elites. We investigate this hypothesis, using the case of a school reform undertaken in 
Imperial Austria in 1869. We show that while landowners were less likely to vote for school 
modernization than urban and business interests, the strongest opposition came from the rural 
areas where the suffrage was in fact most numerous. The reform passed in spite of their 
opposition but, interestingly, post-reform developments suggest that passive resistance to it 
continued in the countryside in spite of the alleged benefits that education was billed to bring the 
masses. 
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1. Introduction 
 Universal literacy, commonplace today in all developed industrialized countries, was 
achieved during the 19th and 20th centuries thanks to the emergence of mass schooling (Baten 
and Crayen, 2010). However, the provision of widely available and easily accessible education 
that would generate such human capital did not emerge overnight. Schooling systems are 
expensive to build and maintain, and since they are frequently financed out of the public purse, 
they are also subject to intense political battles. In this vein, recent economic literature has 
investigated the link between the diffusion of education and the power of various constituencies 
to oppose that diffusion. Historically, landowning elites are often cast as the most likely 
candidates for such opposition (Cinnirella and Hornung, 2013; Galor et al., 2009; Vollrath, 2013). 
In most of these studies, the power of such landed elites is proxied by a measure of inequality of 
land distribution or of the extent of suffrage, the argument being that if landowners indeed 
opposed the spread of schooling, then more unequal land distribution and more limited suffrage 
will correlate with lower provision and slower diffusion of schooling. 
 In our paper, we propose to evaluate this hypothesis about who was for and who against 
the extension of schooling by investigating the actual parliamentary voting of the various 
political forces on a liberal school reform proposed in Austria in May 1869. The reforms aimed to 
replace an outdated schooling system of limited curriculum, poor financial basis and stringent 
oversight by the Catholic Church with a modern, liberal, civil education. It also extended 
compulsory school age to 13 and 14-year olds. At the time of its passage, it was a controversial 
piece of legislation that only narrowly passed in Reichsrat, Austria’s highest representative body. 
The support for the law came overwhelmingly from the representatives of the large cities 
and of business while the landed interests leaned slightly in favour but were generally quite 
lukewarm. The strongest opposition came from the representatives of the general rural 
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population. We argue that the opposition from the agricultural districts came because of the gap 
between their expected costs and the expected benefits: the proposed changes in the curriculum 
and the extension of compulsory school years were more geared towards industrial employment 
and so their implementation in the rural district only encouraged emigration of rural labor force 
to industrializing cities, thereby undercutting the potential benefits to the local communities. At 
the same time, the poorer districts had worse and fewer schools to begin with, so the financial 
requirements to make good on the new law (e.g. the hiring the extra teachers for the extra years 
of schooling and building new schools to increase the density of the educational infrastructure) 
represented a greater marginal cost for the rural, agricultural districts compared to the urban, 
industrial ones. Therefore, in the countryside, the costs of proposed reforms outweighed the 
benefits, while in the cities, it was the other way round. In a sense, by changing the nature, extent 
and content of the primary education, the industrial districts voted themselves an implicit 
subsidy: the countryside would pay for educating future industrial workers. The crucial 
observation that the opposition did not come from the landed magnates but from the rural 
masses goes some way to explain why the implementation of the reform encountered broad 
resistance many years after the passage, leading in some areas to regress in school provision, as 
we show in our final section. 
 
2. Existing theories on the political economy of schooling 
The historical record of the emergence of mass primary schooling varies across countries. 
Central European empires like Austria and Prussia are examples of countries where the decisive 
impulse came from above, where imperial legislation made schooling compulsory already in the 
18th century and where law specified the curriculum and provided for instruction and 
certification of teachers. In other countries, such as the USA and UK, the rise of schooling was 
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more organic, spontaneous and decentralized, although no less “political” for it (Mitch, 1992; 
Troen, 1975). Theories of the political economy of mass education inevitably touch upon almost 
every aspect of schooling because they explicitly or implicitly involve statements about the 
motivations and expectations of individual players: e.g. what were the Austrian and Prussian 
rulers thinking that they were getting out of implementing the system? Why might have rising 
industry been interested in a literate labour force? How did the curriculum respond to the 
changing conditions on the labour market?  
Lindert (2004: Chapter 5) offers an overview of the most prominent explanations behind 
the modern rise of schooling. The cultural explanation sees it either as a consequence of the 
prevailing religious motivation for (Protestants) or against (Catholics) literacy (Landes, 1998: 
178; Becker and Woessman, 2009) or a competition between political forces supporting religious 
versus secular instruction (West and Woessmann, 2010). The social control theory fits well those 
instances, where schooling was imposed from above with the hope that the cathedra would 
supplement the pulpit in inculcating the masses with docility. Such were the cases of Habsburg 
Austria and Prussia, or early 20th century Portugal (Van Horn Melton, 1988; Palma and Reis, 
2012: 5). In an alternative specification, the social control function of mass schooling is 
demanded not by traditionalist rulers but by rising capitalists who desire a disciplined 
workforce.  
In the economic history literature, the most prominent framework for analyzing the 
political economy of schooling pits the masses and industrial entrepreneurs against the (landed) 
elites. In this view, which Lindert (2004: 100) fittingly calls the “Tory opposition theory” and for 
which Galor et al (2009) provide the most coherent theoretical formulation, the landed elites had 
numerous reasons to oppose the extension of schooling. Since human capital was more 
complementary to industrial capital than land, the spread of literacy led to a reallocation of labor 
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from agriculture to industry, thereby reducing returns to land. The public financing of the mass 
schooling introduced a new tax burden, which likely fell at least partly on land, making 
landowners even worse off. The politics of mass schooling becomes the more acrimonious the 
more unequal the land ownership, as the most land-rich (and usually also most powerful) 
individuals stand to lose the most. Studies finding empirical support this theory exist for Prussia 
(Cinnirella and Hornung, 2013), Spain (Beltran-Tapia and Martinez-Galarraga, 2015), USA 
(Vollrath, 2013), Britain (Mitch, 2012) and the BRIC countries (Chaudhary et al, 2012). 
Chaudhary (2009) offers a variation of this theme, where in the Indian context, the role of the 
landed elites was played by the upper castes who preferred to direct public resources towards 
schooling for their own children. 
One empirical prediction emerging from this explanation is that public investment in 
schooling should increase once political institutions become more democratic and the clout of 
the landowners is thereby diluted. Indeed, research into the link between the extension of 
suffrage and public investment in education finds such positive link in the case of Russia 
(Nafziger, 2011), Brazil (Mussachio et al., 2014), former colonies (Gallego, 2010; Mariscal and 
Sokoloff, 2000), the US South (Naidu, 2012) and the USA as a whole (Ramcharan, 2010; Go and 
Lindert, 2010).  
Telling the story of the Austrian school reform is important because, on the surface, it 
could easily give the impression of being consistent with the Tory opposition/democratization 
theory. Up until the 1860-1 introduction of constitutional government with elements of elected 
representation, the Habsburg Empire – particularly its Western half – had next to no lasting 
experience with effective representative (let alone democratic) politics. Then, within a decade of 
the 1861 February Constitution, the ascendant bourgeois political class implemented a broad 
liberal agenda, in which the school reform was an important plank. Ignoring the details of the 
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school reform politics, one could easily see this as another example of the extension of suffrage 
leading in short order to greater investment in the public good of education. Yet, as we show 
below, the main fault line ran not between masses and elites but between the city and the 
countryside. The “most mass” constituencies were the most avid supporters and opponents, 
while the elites, both industrial and landowning, stood more in the middle (though leaning in 
favour) – and the primary reason for the opposition to the extended education was that the 
countryside did not find the investment worthwhile – nay, perhaps even felt exploited by the set-
up (given the implicit subsidy).  
Our results differ from previous research because in two important aspects we are able to 
make explicit what other studies have to either assume or proxy for. One aspect is that we are 
able to use the stipulations of the law and available data on pre-reform extent of schooling to 
explicitly calculate the expected costs and benefits the reform implied for various political 
constituencies. We do not have to rely on theoretical models in the vein of Galor et al. (2009) in 
order to make assumptions regarding the costs and benefits and by extension the political 
economy of schooling expansion. The other aspect is that instead of using measures of land 
inequality as a proxy for relative political influence of landowners versus other constituencies, 
we directly observe the political process where, by fortunate historical coincidence, these 
constituencies were explicitly built into the constitutional and electoral framework. 
 
3. The Austrian school reform of 1869 
 Between 1805 and the reform year 1869, the Austrian primary schooling was governed 
by the so-called Political Constitution of the German Schools, a law that minutely regulated every 
aspect of the schooling system (K.k. Schulbucher-Verschleiß-Administration, 1847). Schooling 
was compulsory for children aged 6 to 12, who passed through the school’s two grades receiving 
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mostly religious instruction and learning basic literacy skills under the watchful eye of the 
Catholic Church. Town schools had a somewhat more extensive curriculum than country schools, 
allowing for some geometry, geography and biology in the third and sometimes even a fourth 
grade but they were few and far between. The schools were financed partly by the towns and 
villages they catered to, partly by the local feudal authorities. Already by late 1840s, the 
obsolescence of the law became obvious (Frank, 1898). The law had not been updated to keep 
abreast of new developments in pedagogy, teacher training was deliberately kept short and 
superficial and once the revolutions of 1848 removed the last vestiges of the old feudal order, 
even the financial underpinning of the schools gradually disintegrated. A thorough school reform 
in a liberal vein, attempted in the wake of 1848, never moved beyond the proposal stage and was 
soon quashed by a conservative pushback. Instead, throughout the 1850s and early 1860s, 
whatever changes were introduced into the schooling system came by way of ad hoc fixes and 
piecemeal amendments which, however, left the limited curriculum, the meager financial base 
and the church oversight intact (Ficker, 1873, Engelbrecht, 1986). 
 A new opportunity for fundamental reform only came once the Habsburg Empire’s basic 
constitutional questions – most crucially the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 – were 
resolved. A new, modern, liberal constitution, passed in December 1867, stipulated, among the 
basic civil rights and liberties, the right of access to education and an equality of all faiths and 
religions. The reform of primary schools then came in two parts. First, in May 1868, the Law on 
Relations between School and Church (Schule-Kirche-Gesetz) secularized the school oversight, 
transferring the powers of school inspection and teacher appointment from church to civil 
authorities.1 It established local school boards, opened all public schools to pupils of all 
                                                        
1 The full texts of all the post-1848 laws cited in this paper are drawn from the ALEX database of 
the Austrian National Library (ALEX, 2011). 
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confessions and all teaching positions to all certified teachers, regardless of their religion.2 In 
contrast to previous legislation, which gave the Church powers to guard against heresy in every 
subject taught in schools, the new law limited the church’s control exclusively to religious 
instruction and explicitly put all other subjects out of its purview. The law was passed against 
great opposition from the church authorities, even earning a stern condemnation from the Pope 
within a month of passage, but as for the parliamentary representation, the official record 
unfortunately does not show which representative voted which way.  
The second part of the reform was the Law on Primary Schools (Reichsvolksschulgesetz) 
passed in May 1869. It laid down the basic guidelines for the newly secularized schools, touching 
upon all aspects, from school curriculum to teacher training. Article 3 mandated that in addition 
to religious instruction and basic literacy, every school also introduce the teaching of biology, 
geography, history/civics, geometry, music and physical education. For girls, it also required 
home economics and some training in domestic work. In Articles 4 and 7, the law fixed the length 
of each school grade at exactly one year and empowered the education minister to devise 
teaching plans for each grade, including the allocation of teaching hours for each subject. Article 
21 extended the compulsory schooling by two years, from 6 to 14. Articles 26 – 58 dealt with the 
training, appointment and oversight of teachers, seeking to turn them into modern professional 
staff with the prestige and income of tenured public servants. Article 59 required that a primary 
school be established wherever 40 school-age children live more than a half-mile from the 
nearest school. This provision called for a denser school network than was the case under 
previous legislation, which mandated a new school for every 80 such school-age children. 
Formalizing the prevailing practice on the ground, Article 62 placed the burden of school 
                                                        
2 The old Political Constitution of German Schools barred Protestant teachers from teaching 
Catholic children and Catholic children from attending Protestant schools. 
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financing primarily on the shoulders of the towns and villages the schools served, although it left 
it to provincial authorities to work out the specifics and perhaps bring in other sources of funds. 
Articles 68 – 73 made good on the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of instruction by 
setting the rules for the establishment of private schools and their integration into the 
educational system. 
All in all, the new law envisioned a school that would be bigger in pupil numbers, broader 
in its curriculum, better staffed and consequently significantly more expensive than its 
predecessor. Perhaps this boldness of design was why the legislators, who aimed to lay down the 
common, unifying rules for all the non-Hungarian parts of the Empire, suddenly blinked in 
Article 75 and granted certain rural, less developed provinces exemptions from the extension of 
the compulsory schooling age.3 Still, the expected extra costs, together with the shift in emphasis 
to new content in the curriculum, were to be the main points of contention in the political battle 
for the law’s passage.  
 
4. The contours of the Austrian electoral system 
 The 1860s brought Austria her first extended experience with representative 
government. The representation was granted only reluctantly by the Emperor in 1860 – 1861, in 
the wake of a lost war and chronic fiscal problems (Taylor, 1965). The Habsburgs’ traditional 
distrust of popular politics found its expression not so much in the limited suffrage as in the 
outsized representation granted to groups that the emperor considered “politically reliable”: 
aristocrats and landowners, richer burghers, church representatives and ethnic Germans. At the 
same time, the 1860s were also a time of constitution-making and so the resulting political 
architecture had to somehow incorporate and absorb the conflicting interests of the empire’s 
                                                        
3 The provinces were Dalmatia, Galicia, Carniola, Bukowina and Austrian Littoral. 
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numerous nationalities, the various regional and factional jealousies and the diverging opinions 
among the public on the powers and competences of the imperial capital vis-à-vis the individual 
provinces. For example, the division of powers between the provincial representative assemblies 
and the supra-provincial legislature in Vienna was an issue of ongoing political controversy. The 
constitution, as it eventually settled down, rested on the broadest possible consensus but 
certainly not a universal one (Macartney, 1971). 
 Table 1 shows the extent of suffrage as of the elections in Spring 1867. There were in total 
about 1.25 million voters (if we add in an estimated 35.000 rural voters in place for the missing 
data from Littoral), which represented about 23% of the adult male population. Their votes were 
not equal, however, as the voters were divided into four separate electoral curias. Who belonged 
in which curia depended on one’s location and income. For example, in the Bohemian 
landowners’ curia only those landowners qualified for a vote whose land tax bill exceeded 250 fl 
annually. There were 471 such individuals in the whole province. In Lower Austria, the threshold 
was 200 fl, yielding 201 voters.4 Suffrage in cities was tied to a permanent residency or place of 
business and either a tax census (e.g. 2-8 fl. per year in the Bohemian city of Reichenberg, 
depending on type of business) or a particular profession (suffrage was granted to priests, public 
servants, military officers and academics). These two curias elected their representatives 
directly. In rural communities and Chambers of Commerce, the vote was indirect. All factory 
operators and business owners, large and small, had the right to elect Chamber of Commerce 
councilors, who then, by virtue of being councilors, voted for their Chamber’s representatives in 
the legislature. Rural communities in each given rural district elected one elector per 500 voters, 
                                                        
4 For comparison, in 1867, the day wage of an unskilled labourer in Bohemia was 0.68 fl (K.k. 
Statistische Zentral-Commision, 1869). A teacher’s median annual salary was 240 fl (K.k. 
Statistische Zentral-Commision, 1870)  
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determined, as in cities, on the basis of residency and tax census; the electors then chose the 
district’s representative. 
 The inequality in the suffrage lay in the fact that different curias elected a different 
number of representatives. For example, the Bohemian provincial assembly had 241 members 
coming from the four different curias: 70 members were elected by the 471 landowning voters, 
72 came from the urban districts, 15 represented the five Bohemian Chambers of Commerce and 
79 members the 182,526 voters in the rural curia.5 While the rights to vote in various curias 
were mutually exclusive, territorially, some of the electoral districts overlapped. For example, 
the rural district around the towns of Eger, Asch and Wildstein in western Bohemia elected one 
representative while the towns of Asch and Rossbach in that same area elected another one and 
the Chamber of Commerce in Eger – which encompassed both the aforementioned towns and 
their countryside, as well as another fifth of the province – another three. At the same time, any 
large landowners living in that area voted for their representative in the landowners’ curia, for 
which the whole province constituted the electoral district. The constitution set the specific 
quotas, territorial divisions and suffrage conditions for each province separately but the 
underlying structure was the same everywhere. 
The pinnacle of all representative bodies was the Viennese legislature, the Reichsrat, 
which consisted of 203 representatives from the 13 different provinces. Until 1873, voters never 
voted for Reichsrat in Vienna directly. The 203 members were delegated by the provincial 
assemblies from among the provincial representatives according, again, to a minutely specified 
                                                        
5 Another five members were ex offo: the archbishop of Prague, bishops of Budweis, Koniggratz 
and Leitmeritz and the Rector of the Prague University. 
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key, which ensured that each curia would have its representatives. Table 2 reports their 
distribution as of the end of legislative session in May 1869.6 
Comparing the numbers in Tables 1 and 2 reveals the scale of the electoral inequality: on 
average, there was 1 representative for every 91.5 voting landowners compared to 1 
representative per 14,967 voters in the rural communities and per 3307.5 voters in cities. 
Corresponding ratio for the Chambers of Commerce (48.9) is not quite comparable here because 
we only have the number of councilors who cast their ballot, not the number of voters who 
elected them. While from the point of view of modern democratic politics, the electoral system 
was deplorably unfair, it presents some definite advantages for our analytical purposes. It makes 
explicit the choices of the very political constituencies, which appear as dramatis personae in the 
usual accounts of political economy of schooling. In contrast to, say, Vollrath (2013), we can 
observe the vote by landowning members of the legislature who represent nothing but the 
landowning interest. The electoral system separates for us the cities from the countryside and 
the businessmen and industrialists from the landowners. We do not need to speculate, or proxy 
for, how much political clout the large landowners had relative to their less land-endowed fellow 
citizens: we know exactly that the 4943 magnates (surely the absolute summit of landed wealth 
in the country of 20.4 million) had 54 representatives out of 185, when it came to this particular 
piece of legislation. 
 
                                                        
6 The first obvious point to note is that their number only adds up to 185 and not 203. Some 14 
Bohemian and 1 Moravian representatives of Czech nationality boycotted the Viennese 
legislature, having objections to the whole constitutional arrangement. They were never sworn 
in, never showed up in the chamber and never participated in any legislative process. Another 
representative died in January 1869 and further two had been promoted to Herrenhaus, the 
Austrian equivalent of the House of Lords, at about the same time. As of May 1869, their 
respective provincial assemblies have still not got around to send their replacements. Thus, there 
were 185 Reichsrat members whose voting record on the school reform we can analyze. 
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5. The political economy of the vote on school reform 
The bill on the reform of primary schools was first introduced into Reichsrat on 4th March 
1869 and was sent to the confessional committee, as schools were considered a religious matter. 
The plenary debate began on 21st April 1869, when it emerged from the committee with a stamp 
of approval and only minor amendments. Over the next four days, eleven speakers argued in 
favor of the bill, nine against (K.k Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1869: 5719 – 5821).  
Representatives Sawczynski (urban curia, Galicia), a former teacher and school 
administrator, and Grocholski (landowner, Galicia) attacked the bill on constitutional grounds, 
arguing that it micromanaged the educational system in ways and areas that the constitution 
reserved for provincial assemblies. Representative Pascotini (urban curia, Littoral) criticized the 
extension of compulsory schooling as impracticable, costly and therefore un-implementable in 
many southern provinces while Albert Jäger (rural curia, Tyrol), a university professor from 
Innsbruck, added that the extra content mandated by Article 3 would be superfluous and useless 
in the countryside. He also estimated that implementing all the provisions of the bill would 
increase Tyrol’s education expenditures fourfold, a burden that would make the rural 
communities “sweat blood.” Another two rural Tyrolean members, Ignaz Giovanelli and Josef 
Greuter, considered the bill in breach of the “natural rights of the church and of parents over 
their children”. Such reservations over the bill’s secularizing thrust were expressed not only by 
several other Catholic members but also by Protestants, such as Karl Schneider (rural curia, 
Silesia) who in civil life worked as a dignitary of the Silesian Lutheran church, and the Protestant 
pastor Karl Bauer (urban curia, Carinthia). Slovenian representative Toman (Chambers of 
Commerce, Carniola) objected to the bill’s weak guarantees against Germanization through 
schooling and implied that in each school the language of instruction should be decided locally 
and not by provincial authorities, as the bill proposed. 
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Supporters of the bill pushed back by pointing out that, imperfect though the bill was, it 
still represented a vast improvement over the existing outdated law. Moreover, they argued, 
many of the objections raised could be worked into the bill as part of the second reading. But 
Sawczynski’s constitutional objections ultimately became the rallying point for the opposition, 
who refused to even discuss individual provisions of the bill, article by article, and instead 
demanded its outright rejection. When the proceedings came to a vote and their proposal to 
reject the bill before the second reading was defeated, the opposition left the chamber en masse. 
It is only thanks to this walkout that we know the names of all the supporters and the opponents 
of the law: for vast majority of votes, the parliamentary protocol did not even record the 
numbers for and against, let alone names. But since the walkout suddenly reduced the number of 
members present and put the chamber’s quorum in question, the presiding officer ordered a roll-
call vote, which was then recorded in the official protocol. On 24th April 1869, the proposed Law 
on Primary School passed the third reading with 111 votes in favor, 4 votes against and 70 
“absent”. 
 
5.1. Measuring the costs and benefits of the school reform 
In our analysis of this vote, we make use of two sets of variables. One set contains the 
political/electoral variables, namely the electoral curia and province of each representative. 
These are readily available from the official records of the Reichsrat and of the provincial 
assemblies. The other set contains relevant educational variables from the districts that the 
politicians represented. The assumption behind using these statistics is the notion that a 
representative’s stance towards the reform bill would be affected by the relative costs and 
benefits the proposal entailed for his constituents. We use the Detail-Conscription den 
Volksschulen, a comprehensive school census conducted in the Spring of 1865, which contains 
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data on the 12054 primary schools then operating in Imperial Austria. Because of the precise 
data on location of each school, we can easily place each school in the relevant electoral district 
of each of the 185 representatives and evaluate what kind of educational situation prevailed in 
his district before the reform and how the proposed reform affected his voters.7 For all other 
demographic and economic variables, we rely on the 1869 population census, which provided 
data both on the age structure and on the employment structure of individual administrative 
units (K.k. Statistische Zentral-Commission, 1871). 
We then construct two variables to gauge the costs and benefits, for each district, of the 
school reform. One is a measure of the expected costs of compliance with the new regulations. 
The bill left a lot of the specifics to provincial assemblies but nonetheless laid down the rules for 
several basic parameters pertaining to school provision. In Article 11, it determined that a new 
teacher has to be hired for every 80 pupils in school and, in order to prevent backsliding in the 
quality of teaching staff, imposed a constraint that untenured substitute teachers may make up 
no more than a third of the staff. Article 21 mandated that the number of pupils would go up by 
about a third due to the extension of the compulsory schooling age (unless provinces, exempted 
in Art. 75, decided otherwise).8 At the same time, Article 7 identified each school grade with a 
particular full-year curriculum (whose precise content were to be determined by the ministry), 
whose mastery was required for a pupil’s progression through school. This provision effectively 
                                                        
7 The exceptions here were the schools in Galicia, Bukowina and Dalmatia, which were not 
reported individually but were aggregated into school districts. For the representatives from the 
landowning curia, the district aggregation has no effect. For the rural and urban representatives, 
the worry is that school district boundaries did not exactly match the electoral districts’ 
boundaries. For each such electoral districts, we matched it with a school district that most 
closely matches its geographical location. 
8 Our search of the provincial legislation shows that Bukowina, Galicia and Carniola (but not 
Dalmatia and the Austrian Littoral) did indeed avail themselves of the exemption and kept the 
compulsory school age at 6 to 12 or 7 to 13 years of age. We incorporate these local provincial 
specifics into the calculations that follow. 
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put an end to half-year schools, which for districts that relied heavily on them (as some did in 
Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Carinthia and Carniola) implied having to pay their teachers full-year, not just 
for half a year. Give that we know, from the 1865 school census, the local school structure as well 
as the composition of the teaching staff in each district, we can calculate, what kind of cost hike 
(in terms of salary expenses) the new provisions implied, if one took – as, for example, 
representative Jäger did in the debate – the current state of things as the basis for estimation. In 
short, we estimate the expected cost hike as the ratio of the expected salary costs and current (as 
of 1865) salary costs: 
Eq. 1     𝐸𝐶𝐼 = (
4
3
𝑃6−12
80
𝑇1865
) [1 + 0.4 max(0, 𝑠 − 1
3
)](1 + ℎ) 
In this expression, ECI is the expected cost increase. P6-12 is the number of pupils aged 6 to 12 
years who were either enrolled or were supposed to be enrolled, according to the schools’ 
records in the 1865 school census. Their number is multiplied by 4/3 to reflect the extension of 
the compulsory school age.9 The division by 80 yields the number of teachers necessary to 
comply with Article 11 of the new law. A further division by T1865 – the number of teacher 
available in 1865 – provides the factor by which the teaching staff will have to be increased. The 
expression in the square brackets reflects the fact that substitute teachers needed to replaced 
with fully certified teachers, if their share, s, were greater than one third of the teaching staff, and 
the fact, evident from the 1865 data, that established teachers earn salary about 40% higher than 
substitute teachers (hence the factor 0.4). Finally, h is the proportion of half-year schools that 
would need to be converted to full-year schools. If h is close to 1 and most district’s teachers 
                                                        
9 We assume that the neighboring birth cohorts are comparable in size. It would not make much 
of a contribution to use more accurate demographic data because our purpose in constructing 
this variable is not to get a precise figure on the cost change but rather to capture the variation in 
what the decision makers – politicians of late 1860s – could reasonably estimate to be the costs 
associated with the reform. 
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currently draw salary for only half-year of work, the conversion would clearly almost double 
such district’s salary budget. In constructing this ratio, we take existing salaries as given, which is 
perhaps the least problematic of all plausible assumptions considering that the reform bill left all 
salary specification to provincial assemblies and local school boards. 
 The second variable we construct aims at the potential benefits of the school reform.  Our 
measure of the literacy content of the local labor market is a number between 0 and 1 and is 
constructed as a weighted average of the local occupations where the weights reflect how likely a 
person in a given occupation will need to be literate to successfully do his or her job.  Our 
underlying assumption is that this measure of literacy content positively correlates with the 
human-capital intensity of local labor markets generally. Therefore, districts with high literacy 
content will benefit more from the extension of the curriculum, specified in Article 3; will more 
likely offer better jobs to the graduates of the new and improved primary schools and will 
therefore be more likely to support the reform. In the classification of the occupations, we rely on 
Mitch (1992) who divides them into four groups: those requiring literacy, those where literacy is 
useful but not indispensable, those where impact of literacy is ambiguous and finally those 
occupations that do not require literacy. The weights we assign the four groups are 1, 0.7, 0.4 and 
0.10 The occupational structure comes from the 1869 population census, which recorded the 
numbers employed in 50 different occupations across all sectors. One worrisome issue regarding 
this variable is that the 1869 census districts do not line up exactly with the 1867 electoral 
districts due to an administrative reform passed by the same Reichsrat in 1868. Because the 
administrative reform consolidated the roughly 900 smaller pre-reform districts into about 400 
bigger ones, the literacy content measure covers bigger areas than were the electoral districts of 
                                                        
10 We have employed the same measure in our previous work on the Austrian schooling, see 
Cvrcek and Zajicek (2013) for details. 
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the urban and rural representatives.11 It is a mismeasurement that we unfortunately cannot 
completely avoid. 
 
5.2. Analysis 
Table 3 presents a comparison of several educational measures in districts whose 
members supported the law with districts of the reform’s opponents. The table shows that the 
supporters of the reform overwhelmingly hailed from places that had higher-quality educational 
infrastructure already in 1865, four years before the reform. Their schools had on average more 
extensive curriculum, as measured by the average number of grades offered in a school. They 
had a higher proportion of schools teaching all day all year, in contrast to the opponents’ districts 
where, on average, 37% of schools either only taught for only half a day or they even closed for 
half a year. Pro-reform districts also had better maintained school buildings by a significant 
margin. They charged higher tuition fee of the pupils. But the even bigger difference between the 
two groups in the per-pupil spending on teaching staff (2.51 fl vs 3.20 fl) indicates that the 
reform supporters came from districts that were also more willing to supplant the tuition 
revenues with other public sources to pay the teachers. Yet, the reform districts also had more 
pupils per teacher. The cost and benefit comparisons yield intuitive results. Pro-reform districts 
could expect, on average, a 54% increase in their salary outlays while the opponents represented 
areas where costs would more than double, post-reform. The labor markets in opposing districts 
also exhibited lower literacy content, although the difference, while statistically significant, is 
small. 
                                                        
11 Representatives of the landowning and commercial curias had electoral districts covering 
much bigger areas – such as whole provinces – which are not difficult to aggregate from the 
administrative units reported in the 1869 census. 
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The bottom half of table 3 repeats the same comparisons for urban and rural districts. In 
all cases, except pupils per teacher, the differences work in the same direction as in the first set 
of comparisons but are generally bigger. The urban-rural gap is particularly stark in the average 
number of grades, the extent of full-time teaching, the per-pupil salary expense and the literacy 
content. On the other hand, the difference between city and country in expected cost increase is 
smaller than it was between supporters and opponent – an indication that, lofty constitutional 
concerns notwithstanding, the vote indeed lined up on the basis of “dollars and cents.” However, 
these simple pair-wise comparisons do not address the main question raised at the outset, 
regarding the role of the landed elites versus the masses in pushing for more, and modern, 
education. To answer that, we want to analyze the support for reform in connection with the 
electoral curias. 
We estimate the impact of political constituency and of costs and benefits on a 
representative’s vote in the context of a probit model. Our dependent variable is 1 when the 
representative voted for the law in the third reading and 0 otherwise. Our full specification is: 
Eq. 2      𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛼 + 𝑪𝒊𝜷 + 𝛾𝐿𝐶𝑖 + 𝛿𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 + 𝑷𝒊𝜼) 
where, for each representative i, Ci is a vector of three dummy variables, one of each electoral 
curia (excepting the rural districts), LCi is the literacy content in his electoral district, ECIi the 
expected cost increase due to reform and Pi is a vector of province fixed effects. The results and 
average marginal effects are presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
 We first estimate several partial specifications to show how the inclusion of new 
explanatory variables changes the results. In columns (i) and (ii) of Table 4, the specification 
includes nothing but the electoral fixed effects. Urban representatives were on average 30.4% 
more likely to vote for the law than their rural counterparts and 18.3% more likely than the 
landowners. A 2-test rejects equality of the coefficient on urban curia and landowning curia with 
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a p-value of 0.047 and, of course, the urban coefficient is statistically different from zero, i.e. from 
the “rural coefficient” because the rural districts fixed effect is the omitted category. These are 
sizeable differences between the various constituencies. 
In columns (iii) and (iv), we estimate the probit with nothing but cost-benefit variables, as 
defined in section 5.1. The coefficients have expected signs but the size of the average marginal 
effects suggests that it was only the expected cost that practically mattered: increasing ECI by 
one standard deviation (1.41) would reduce one’s probability of voting for the law by 24%. On 
the other hand, increasing LC by one standard deviation (0.067) increases the probability by 
4.4%. 
In columns (v) and (vi), the electoral and cost-benefit variables appear side by side. The 
coefficient and marginal effect of ECI is mostly unaffected while the impact of literacy content is 
now even smaller than previously. Most importantly, the curial fixed effects decreased, 
compared to columns (i) and (ii). The 2-test no longer rejects equality between any of the 
coefficients, although the urban coefficient and average marginal effect is still statistically 
different from zero, i.e. the urban-rural divide does not completely go away when accounting for 
costs and benefits. At any rate, the residual gap between the most ardent supporters and 
opponents of the law, once costs and benefits are explicitly controlled for, falls from 30.4% in 
column (ii) to 19.4 in column (vi). 
Finally, in columns (vii) and (viii), we also include province fixed effects. This leads to the 
loss of 11 observations because the Bukovina and Silesian delegations voted unanimously for the 
law and so the respective provincial fixed effects perfectly predict success. Still, the expected cost 
of reform is statistically significant at 6%, although the average marginal effect is reduced 
somewhat. The coefficient on LC has the wrong sign but is economically unimportant: 
throughout the four specifications, the practical impact of literacy content is as good as zero. The 
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differences between individual electoral curias have now shrunk further, with the largest gap – 
between urban and rural districts – amounting to 15.3%. 
Since probit is a non-linear model, we can use these specifications to compare not only 
the marginal impact of belonging to a particular curia, we can also compare how sensitive each 
curia was on average to the costs. In Table 5, we report the average marginal effects of ECI and 
LC for each curia separately, using the last two specifications from Table 4. In either case, the 
urban representatives seemed to be the least responsive to the costs and benefits, while rural 
ones the most.  This is noteworthy because the rural districts not only faced higher costs on 
average, as reported in Table 3, but their costs were also more varied, with standard deviation of 
1.96 compared 0.87 for the urban districts. 
In Table 6, we rerun the same specifications as in Table 4 with a slightly different dataset. 
We know from the official record that some representatives were “absent” not because they 
walked out of the chamber on the day of the vote but because they were ill, on leave or not yet 
sworn in. One can certainly consider taking a leave or calling in sick during such important 
deliberations as an expression of opposition to the proposed law (or at least insufficiently strong 
support to brave the illness or postponing the vacation) which is what we implicitly assumed in 
the estimation in Table 4. Perhaps a safer assumption is that pre-planned or health-related 
absence carries no information about one’s political position, which is why we run the same 
models as in Table 4 but now excluding those who were absent for the reasons specified above. 
We found 11 such cases, which brings the dataset to 174 observations. 
The results remain structurally the same as we saw in Table 4. Initial differences between 
curias are relatively large but once other variables are brought in, the differences become 
markedly smaller. The marginal effects of expected costs and the literacy content in columns (iv) 
and (vi) are of comparable size to those reported earlier. The last column, however, is different. 
 22 
This is again because the inclusion of provincial fixed effects leads to significant loss of 
observations that can be perfectly predicted by them. The combination of 9 more variables with 
29 fewer observations also impacts statistical significance. 
To summarize, there are three main conclusions that emerge from the estimates 
presented so far. One is that the proposed school reform revealed a clear political fault line 
between agriculture and industry, broadly conceived. The industrial and business interests 
(Chambers of commerce and cities) were more eager to vote for it than landowners and rural 
districts across all specifications. The second conclusion is that the costs (though not so much the 
benefits) associated with the specific provisions in the law are an important determinant of a 
representative’s eventual position and go some way towards “explaining away” the observed 
curial differences.  
The last and perhaps the most interesting conclusion is that the strongest opposition 
came not from the closed clique of powerful large landowners but from most numerous voting 
group, the rural districts. In all specifications, except one, these were the least likely to see their 
representative vote for the law. This casts some doubt on the notion that the increased provision 
of public goods is closely tied with the extension of suffrage and political voice of the masses. In 
fact, a simple equal suffrage would have buried the law: if, instead of the disproportionate 
representation of the landowners, each curia had as many representatives as were proportionate 
to the number of enfranchised voters (see Table 1), then, using the predicted probabilities based 
on model (vii) in Table 4, the reform would have failed in the Reichsrat, with only 89 out of 185 
voting for it. It is tempting to blame the rural opposition and the landowners’ support on the 
financing provisions of the school reform: perhaps if the law had proposed to pay for the 
modernized schools by way of an eye-watering estates tax instead of burdening the local 
communities, the magnates would have been up in arms and the countryside on board. But the 
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local financing stipulations applied to cities as well as villages, yet urban districts elected by far 
the most avid supporters of the reform and that gap between the city and the countryside, 
diminished though it was by explicitly controlling for costs of reform, remained non-negligible. 
 
6. Consequences of the reform 
 The passage of the law confronted the local authorities in the newly created school 
districts with the task of implementing its provisions. On the one hand, the law opened up new 
opportunities for improvements that could make schooling more responsive to the needs of the 
local economy: it made room for the development of private schools, it introduced new subjects 
that the old legislation shut out entirely, it provided for a higher professional standard for the 
teachers. On the other hand, it made binding numerous provisions that to many, e.g. the rural 
representatives in Reichsrat, seemed excessive and entirely superfluous in the economic and 
social context of their districts – but now had the force of the law. The determination and the 
speed (or lack thereof) of the implementation is a test of our earlier claim that perhaps the 
returns to the new and improved primary schooling varied between the city and the countryside 
and that therefore the fiscal costs of full-scale implementation were harder to justify in the 
villages. 
From 1870 onwards, the newly established school authorities adopted the practice of 
regular five-year survey of all schools. The first such survey, conducted during the 1870/71 
school year, came almost right on the heels of the reform, when still relatively little impact could 
be expected. The second survey of Spring 1875, however, can provide an indication of how far 
things have changed, compared to the 1865 school census (K.k. Statistische Zentral-Commission, 
1876). The source data are arranged by civil districts, created by the administration reform of 
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1868, which gives us with 273 observations.12 We combine these schooling data with the 1869 
census information on employment composition and level of urbanization in each district. 
 Figures 1 and 2 offer a glimpse of the changes over the decade. In view of the urban-rural 
contrast in political stance towards the 1869 school reform, we split the districts into three 
categories by degree of urbanization. In order to facilitate the comparison between the 1865 
data on the horizontal axis and the 1875 data on the vertical axis, we also draw a 45° line into the 
scatterplot. Figure 1 shows the change in the extent of the curriculum. The highly urbanized 
districts, with more than 50% of population living in cities of 3000 inhabitants and more, 
overwhelmingly availed themselves of the provisions of the law and introduced new grades and 
new subjects. On the other hand, the low-urbanization districts, where less than 20% of the 
population was urbanized, mostly fell below the 45° line – in other words, the curriculum was 
reduced in many places from two to one grade or from three to two grades. The same is true for 
the “medium-urbanized” districts. 
  The urban-rural divide is perhaps not as stark in Figure 2, since even a good number of 
low-urbanized districts saw a small increase in the relative number of teachers, but it is still 
there. In some urban districts, the supply of teachers more than doubled and there were only a 
few highly-urbanized districts that fell back relative to 1865. If we also drew a horizontal line at 
12.5 teachers per 1000 school-age children, roughly corresponding to the regulation of having no 
more than 80 pupils per teacher, then most of the highly urbanized districts would be easily in 
compliance with the law, while a non-negligible proportion of the low-urbanization districts 
would be short of teachers. 
                                                        
12 Since the 1865 school census provided location for every individual school, we can 
retrospectively recreate the administrative units in the 1865 data to make them comparable 
across time. The only province, where, even by 1875, the new school authorities still have not 
sufficiently settled down to submit appropriate data, was Galicia, which we therefore have to 
leave out of the analysis. 
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 How did the implementation respond to local costs and benefits of primary schooling? It 
is difficult to say much anything specific about the local variation in social return to education in 
the context of a centrally mandated level of provision (even if some districts were dragging their 
feet in implementing it) because the local provision may be motivated not just by the returns but 
also by some (hard to observe) level of enforcement or encouragement from the central 
authorities. Private returns, however, are a somewhat different matter because the school 
reform did not compel the formation of private primary schools; it only made room for them. 
This was a big change compared to the pre-1869 legislation, where private schools were only 
permitted in special circumstances such as when catering to very particular niche markets or as 
temporary substitutes for lacking local public schools. To the extent that primary education is a 
public good, its social returns will be higher than private returns. Therefore, where private 
schools arose and expanded, one can assume that the extent of public provision and its post-
reform expansion was sufficiently below the social optimum to leave a profitable market opening 
for the private providers. On the other hand, where private schools failed to materialize even 
with public provision below the centrally mandated level, one may infer that the law’s mandate 
demanded schooling supply beyond the optimum. Clearly, the marginal social returns of this 
“oversupplied” public education were even below the private ones. 
 We use a simple regression and tobit analysis to more precisely gauge the relative 
importance of the costs and returns in the local local labor market. The three main 
characteristics of local schooling that we analyze are the change in teacher supply (measured by 
the number of teachers per 1000 school-age children), the classroom provision (number of 
classrooms per 1000 school-age children) and the change in the extent of the curriculum 
between 1865 and 1875. We construct three variables measuring this change:  
Eq. 3a     Δ𝑡𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖,1875 − 𝑡𝑖,1865  
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Eq. 3b     Δ𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖,1875 − 𝑟𝑖,1865 
Eq. 3c     Δ𝑔𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖,1875 − 𝑔𝑖,1865 
where ti,1875 and ti,1865 are the teacher indicators, ri,1875 and ri,1865 are classroom indicators and 
gi,1875 and gi,1865 the average number of grades in a district’s schools in the respective years. We 
use these three measures of change as our dependent variables. Note that in case of the private 
schools, the 1865 entries were zero and so the change over the decade was equal to the extent of 
private school provision in 1875. 
 In light of our reasoning, we conduct separate analysis for private schools and for public 
schools.13 The two types of schools require somewhat different econometric models. While all 
districts had public schools both in 1865 and in 1875 and the change in the three school 
characteristics can be calculated for all of them as a continuous variable that can theoretically 
take on both positive and negative values, private schools did not exist in 1865 anywhere and 
even by 1875, there were some 81 districts (out of 273) that reported no private schools at all. 
As a result, the change in private provision over 1865 – 1875 was either positive or zero. Given 
this censoring, a simple OLS would not be appropriate for the analysis of private schools and we 
therefore rely on tobit instead. As before, we use the literacy content of the district labor market 
(LCi), based on the 1869 census data on employment composition, and the expected cost increase 
(ECIi) that we defined in Eq. 1.  Our OLS regression specification for public schools is 
Eq. 4a    Δ𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑈𝑖 + 𝜃𝑁𝑖 + 𝑷𝒊𝜼 + 𝜀𝑖 
whereas for tobit 
Eq. 4b     Δ𝑡𝑖
∗ = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑈𝑖 + 𝜃𝑁𝑖 + 𝑷𝒊𝜼 + 𝜀𝑖 
                                                        
13 In case of the change in average grades per school, the private-school variable is not defined 
for 1865 since there were none, so the analysis pertains to change in public school provision and 
then in all-school provision. 
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Δ𝑡𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 Δ𝑡𝑖
∗ ≤ 0; Δ𝑡𝑖 = Δ𝑡𝑖
∗ 𝑖𝑓 Δ𝑡𝑖
∗ > 0 
We include as controls the proportion of the district population living in a city of more than 3000 
inhabitants, Ui, as a measure of urbanization and the proportion of the population that is German, 
Ni.  We also include, as before, a vector of provincial fixed effects, Pi. We use the same 
specification for all three dependent variables. If the local labour market demand for human 
capital drove the changes in school provision, then we expect  to be large, positive and 
significant. The expected cost of implementation, ECIi, calculated for each district according to 
Eq. 1, is a control that basically captures how far from the new mandated provision the various 
districts were in 1865. We expect that, other things (such as benefits of schooling captured by 
LCi) held equal, a high ECIi would mean less of a room for private school provision, making  
negative in specifications with private schools. For public school, we expect  to be positive as 
schools farther away from the centrally mandated level of primary school provision would be 
subjected to stronger enforcement from central authorities to comply with the new reform; on 
the other hand, districts that were close to the level or were even compliant with the law ahead 
of its passage by virtue of their preexistent school supply can be reasonably expected to expand 
less, ceteris paribus. In terms of comparison of effects and coefficients across specifications, the 
tobit marginal effects and coefficients require careful interpretation. A tobit model can yield 
information on the marginal impact of an explanatory variable on the observed value of the 
dependent variable, as well as on the probability of it being positive. For our purposes, the most 
logical interpretation is to focus on the plain coefficients yielded by the tobit estimation. These 
capture the marginal effect of explanatory variables on the latent variable, t*i, and therefore 
convey information about the returns and costs (on the margin) to private primary school 
investment. We are not, after all, trying to model the emergence of private schooling per se but 
only to use its existence and extent as a gauge of the variation in overall marginal social returns.  
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 Table 7 shows the estimation results. Our aim is to see to what extent our explanatory 
variables LCi and ECIi can account for the rural-urban divide in post-reform school supply and 
therefore corroborate our earlier claim that the rural representatives’ opposition to the reform 
was motivated by these cost-benefit considerations. For all dependent variables, we run one 
regression without LCi and ECIi and one with them properly included. In all cases, when these 
two variables are included, the coefficient on proportion urbanized, Ui, declines. Clearly, these 
two variables go some way towards explaining the rural-urban variation.  
There are several other observations that emerge from the results. Columns (ii) and (iv) 
show that the expansion of curriculum positively correlated with the literacy content of the local 
labor market. The same was true for the physical infrastructure. An extra standard deviation of 
LCi (=0.066) led to an extra 0.2 grade, extra 0.2 teacher and 0.5 classroom per 1000 school-age 
children in the public schools in a district. The response was even greater for private schools 
where the same change in LCi was associated with an extra 1.58 teacher and 0.87 classroom per 
1000 school-age children. Given how strongly private provision responded to LCi, it is no 
surprise that the rural districts, with considerably less sophisticated labor markets, saw little in 
terms of private school expansion. Of the 81 districts with no private school teachers or 
classrooms, 52 were in the least urbanized category and only 12 in the most urbanized.14 The 
most urbanized districts had about 4.5 more private teachers per 1000 school-age children than 
the least urbanized districts. Of that, about a half can be explained by the difference in average 
LCi, which was about 0.1, using the coefficient  from column (viii) (23.871x0.1 = 2.3871). In 
short, the rural labor markets indeed offered no encouragement to private schooling and the 
private returns cannot but be considered to have been close to zero. 
                                                        
14 Please refer to Figures 1 and 2 for the definitions of the low- and high-urbanized groups. 
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There is also a clear difference between private and public schools in their response to the 
expected cost of implementation, ECIi. The positive  in columns (vi) and (x) imply that there was 
some force towards convergence whereby those districts that were farther away from the 
mandated provision (higher ECIi) saw a somewhat greater expansion than districts closer to the 
mandated levels, ceteris paribus. This force was relatively weak, however. An increase in ECIi by 
one standard deviation (=1.987) led to an extra 0.4 public teacher and 1.0 public classroom per 
1000 school age children. In contrast, the negative  in columns (viii) and (xii) shows that in 
districts with high ECIi and therefore subpar provision of public schools, the private schools were 
less likely to flourish also. Even a considerably lower provision of public schooling in the 
countryside (relative to city) seems to have been enough to meet what must have been a low 
demand, leading again to the conclusion that returns to investment in primary schooling must 
have been low. 
These simple regression results do now allow us to say anything more specific about the 
processes, which on the local level led to the results that we observe here. But the record is 
consistent with the hypothesis that when the rural districts lost the formal vote in Austria’s main 
legislature, they reverted to a sort of passive resistance. They simply ignored the most costly 
stipulations of the law because they were not worth the investment. In the rural areas, economic 
conditions were not particularly conducive to the primary schools’ rapid development. As a 
result, one could say, both the city and the country ultimately got the education they wanted: 
cheap in cost, limited in curriculum and uniform in shape in the country; well-financed, broad in 
curriculum and diverse and market-oriented in the city. 
 
7. Conclusions 
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Formal education, as a form of human capital investment, has its costs and benefits, which 
determine, on the margin, its optimal level and extent. The costs and benefits, as we tried to 
show in section 5, varied significantly from place to place in Imperial Austria, making it very 
difficult to legislate the optimal level of schooling for the whole country. In fact, such stifling one-
size-fits-all arrangement under the old law was the reason why the school reform was taken up 
in the first place. The 1869 law, though leaving numerous aspects to the provincial assemblies to 
decide, nonetheless contained enough blanket mandates to engender a stiff opposition from the 
countryside. Even though these mandates had the force of the law, the enforcement was too 
weak to make them a reality in many areas, while passive resistance lingered on. Engelbrecht 
(1986: 117) documents that in some provinces such as Tyrol it lasted into the 1890s. Local 
church dignitaries actively discouraged school attendance, the provincial assembly refused to 
pass legislation necessary for implementation of the reform until 1892. School inspectors 
sometimes required police protection in order to do their work. As a result, the most successfully 
implemented portions of the law were those that merely enabled change, instead of demanding 
it.  
The case of the Austrian primary school reform of 1869 thus vividly illustrates that the 
political economy of public school provision is complex. All industrial nations, sooner or later, 
introduced a system of publicly financed mass schooling so as to build up the human capital 
necessary for modern economic development. In some countries, however, the path to mass 
schooling encountered opposition from the very masses it was intended to educate.15 To 
generalize, there is no reason to assume that broader suffrage and popular political voice is an 
                                                        
15 A similar conclusion, namely that the demand for schooling was much more lukewarm among 
the rural masses compared to the knowledge elites was also reached by Squicciarini and 
Voigtländer (2016) for pre-revolutionary France. 
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automatic ally of higher provision of public goods, such as primary education. The devil, as 
always, is in the details.  
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Table 1 – Number of people with the right to vote by curia and province 
Province Rural districts Landowners 
Chambers of 
Commerce 
Urban 
districts 
Sum 
Provincial 
population 
in 1869 
census 
Number of 
males 
aged 21+ 
(1869 
census) 
Lower Austria 105,107 201 45 26,540 131,893 1,990,708 593,910 
Upper Austria 31,238 105 30 7,601 38,974 736,557 225,896 
Salzburg 8,607 135 16 2,264 11,022 153,159 47,682 
Styria 59,215 187 44 9,131 68,577 1,137,990 335,885 
Carinthia 14,318 100 23 2,487 16,928 337,694 96,235 
Carniola 33,009 116 22 2,738 35,885 466,334 124,009 
Austrian Littoral N/A 519 30 5,336 5,885 600,525 175,462 
Tyrol & Vorarlberg 55,584 219 46 7,211 63,060 885,789 260,599 
Bohemia 182,526 471 145 50,850 233,992 5,140,544 1,326,613 
Moravia 70,354 168 54 16,474 87,050 2,017,274 516,981 
Silesia 16,743 61 15 4,777 21,596 513,352 125,325 
Galicia 392,656 1,894 57 19,470 414,077 5,444,689 1,346,699 
Bukovina 48,220 141 15 3,586 51,962 513,404 127,331 
Dalmatia 30,137 626 45 3,603 34,411 456,961 128,407 
Sum 1,047,714 4,943 587 162,068 1,215,312 20,394,980 5,431,034 
Note: The numbers of voters in Chambers of Commerce denotes the number of councilors. Source: Beitrage zur Statistik 
der Landtags-Wahlen im Jahre 1867, Mittheilungen aus dem gebiet der Statistik 14, 1867, p. 52 - 55; Bevolkerung der im 
Reichsrathe vertretene Konigreiche und Lander im Jahre 1869, p. 302 
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Table 2 – Number of representatives by curias and provinces in the Austrian Reichsrath 
 Rural districts Landowners 
Chambers of 
Commerce 
Urban 
districts Sum 
Lower Austria 5 5  7 17 
Upper Austria 4 2 1 3 10 
Salzburg 1 1 1  3 
Styria 5 3 1 4 13 
Carinthia 2 1 1 1 5 
Carniola 3 1 2  6 
Austrian Littoral 1 1  4 6 
Tyrol & Vorarlberg 6 2  2 10 
Bohemia 11 14 4 11 40 
Moravia 7 6 1 7 21 
Silesia 2 2  2 6 
Galicia 18 13 1 6 38 
Bukovina 2 2  1 5 
Dalmatia 3 1  1 5 
Sum 70 54 12 49 185 
Note:  
 
  
 2 
Table 3 – School and other characteristics in representatives' districts as of 1865 
 1(voted for) = 0 1(voted for) = 1 t-test p-value 
Number of observations 74 111   
Average number of grades 2.18 2.58 -3.02 0.003 
Proportion of schools teaching full-time 0.63 0.82 -4.57 0.000 
Proportion of school buildings in good order 0.65 0.74 -3.66 0.000 
Tuition fee (fl per year) 1.62 1.99 -2.32 0.022 
Expenditure on teaching staff per pupil 2.51 3.20 -2.35 0.020 
Pupils per teacher 65.70 75.10 -2.41 0.017 
Estimated cost increase due to reform 2.51 1.54 4.81 0.000 
Literacy content of the representative's district's labor market 0.16 0.19 -3.60 0.000 
 Rural districts Urban districts   
Number of observations 70 49   
Average number of grades 2.05 3.40 -14.45 0.000 
Proportion of schools teaching full-time 0.58 0.95 -7.43 0.000 
Proportion of school buildings in good order 0.65 0.84 -5.80 0.000 
Tuition fee (fl per year) 1.56 2.34 -3.98 0.000 
Expenditure on teaching staff per pupil 2.13 4.64 -8.75 0.000 
Pupils per teacher 72.80 64.36 1.61 0.110 
Estimated cost increase due to reform 2.27 1.45 2.73 0.007 
Literacy content of the representative's district's labor market 0.15 0.23 -6.27 0.000 
Note: Since, Galicia, Bukovina and Dalmatia submitted an incomplete set of data for the 1865 school census, we do not have 
grade and tuition data from 48 of the 185 districts, and so the t-tests are based only on 137 observations. Estimated cost 
increase due to reform is a ratio of teaching expenditures to be expected given a district's current number of school-age 
children if the reform law passes divided by the actual current expenditure on teachers in 1865. 
Source: K.K. Statistische Zentral-Commission. Detail-Conscription der Volksschulen der im Reichsrathe vertretenen 
Konigreichen und Landern nach dem Stande vom Ende des Schuljahres 1865. Vienna, 1870 
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Table 4 - Probit models of vote on school reform (dep. var: representative voted for the law = 1, otherwise = 0) 
  
Electoral fixed effects 
only 
Cost-benefit variables 
only 
Full specification 
Full specification with 
province fixed effects 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
  Coefficients Avg marginal FX Coefficients Avg marginal FX Coefficients Avg marginal FX Coefficients Avg marginal FX 
Electoral fixed effects              
1(landowners' curia) 
0.306 0.121   0.305 0.107 0.258 0.063 
[0.228] [0.090]   [0.241] [0.083] [0.304] [0.075] 
1(chambers of commerce) 
0.502 0.195   0.364 0.126 0.389 0.093 
[0.403] [0.149]   [0.420] [0.140] [0.507] [0.114] 
1(urban curia) 
0.829 0.304   0.580 0.194 0.691 0.153 
[0.249] [0.084]     [0.290] [0.095] [0.369] [0.080] 
Cost-benefit variables              
Literacy content 
    1.941 0.652 0.411 0.135 -0.876 -0.194 
    [1.742] [0.580] [1.952] [0.639] [2.730] [0.605] 
Expected cost increase  
    -0.507 -0.170 -0.529 -0.173 -0.480 -0.106 
    [0.130] [0.038] [0.134] [0.038] [0.256] [0.055] 
Constant 
-0.072   0.863  0.913   1.489   
[0.150]   [0.469]   [0.491]   [0.759]   
N 185   185  185   174   
Log-likelihood -118.6   -108.6   -106.3   -69.5   
Tests of linear hypotheses:              
2: landowners’ curia =urban curia 3.950     0.880   1.330   
p-value 0.047     0.348   0.249   
2: Chambers of commerce =urban curia 0.590     0.230   0.290   
p-value 0.441       0.635   0.590   
Note: Standard errors in square brackets. 
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Table 5 - Average marginal effects and their standard errors by electoral curia 
  
Rural 
communities 
Landowners 
Chambers of 
Commerce 
Cities 
Fu
ll 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
 
Expected cost of reform 
-0.186 -0.186 -0.180 -0.138 
[0.041] [0.041] [0.052] [0.036] 
Literacy content 
0.145 0.144 0.140 0.108 
[0.689] [0.686] [0.667] [0.509] 
Fu
ll 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
 
w
it
h
 p
ro
vi
n
ci
al
 
fi
xe
d
 e
ff
e
ct
s 
Expected cost of reform 
-0.117 -0.108 -0.113 -0.087 
[0.061] [0.058] [0.068] [0.046] 
Literacy content 
-0.214 -0.197 -0.207 -0.160 
[0.666] [0.617] [0.646] [0.495] 
Note: Standard errors in square brackets. 
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Table 6 - Probit models of vote on school reform (dep. var: representative voted for = 1, otherwise = 0) 
  
Electoral fixed effects 
only 
Cost-benefit variables 
only 
Full specification 
Full specification with 
province fixed effects 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
  Coefficients Avg marginal FX Coefficients Avg marginal FX Coefficients Avg marginal FX Coefficients Avg marginal FX 
Electoral fixed effects                 
1(landowners' curia) 
0.234 0.092     0.227 0.076 -0.201 -0.043 
[0.237] [0.092]     [0.252] [0.084] [0.360] [0.077] 
1(chambers of commerce) 
0.545 0.203     0.407 0.132 0.473 0.088 
[0.434] [0.148]     [0.456] [0.139] [0.630] [0.110] 
1(urban curia) 
0.753 0.268     0.465 0.149 0.399 0.076 
[0.258] [0.086]     [0.301] [0.095] [0.411] [0.078] 
Cost-benefit variables                 
Literacy content 
    1.872 0.600 0.725 0.229 0.615 0.121 
    [1.810] [0.577] [2.013] [0.634] [3.200] [0.633] 
Expected costs of reform 
    -0.514 -0.165 -0.527 -0.166 -0.186 -0.037 
    [0.131] [0.037] [0.134] [0.037] [0.279] [0.055] 
Constant 
0.060   1.000   1.012   1.270   
[0.158]   [0.484]   [0.504]   [0.854]   
N 174   174   174   145   
Log-likelihood -109.3   -97.8   -96.4   -52.0   
Tests of linear hypotheses:                 
2: landowners’ curia =urban curia 3.690       0.630   2.060   
p-value 0.055       0.429   0.151   
2: Chambers of commerce =urban curia 0.210       0.010   0.010   
p-value 0.647       0.906   0.915   
Note: Standard errors are in square brackets. 
 
  
Figure 1 
 
Note:  “Low urbanization” districts are districts where less than 20% of the inhabitants live in cities of 3.000 or 
more. “High urbanization” districts are those were more than 50% of the district’s inhabitants live in cities of 3.000 
or more. “Medium urbanization” districts are those in between. Average number of grades (per school) measures the 
extent of curriculum offered on average by the schools in a given district. 
 
Figure 2 
  
Note:  “Low urbanization” districts are districts where less than 20% of the inhabitants live in cities of 3.000 or more. 
“High urbanization” districts are those were more than 50% of the district’s inhabitants live in cities of 3.000 or 
more. “Medium urbanization” districts are those in between. 
 Table 7 - Analysis of primary school expansion, 1865 - 1875 
Dep var: Change in average grades 
Change in # teachers per 1000 school-age 
children 
Change in # classrooms per 1000 school-age 
children 
  
all schools - 
OLS 
public schools - 
OLS 
public schools - 
OLS private schools - tobit 
public schools - 
OLS private schools - tobit 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) 
Exp. cost of 
implementatio
n 
  -0.066  -0.031   0.218  -0.788   0.508  -0.546 
  [0.082]  [0.075]   [0.089]  [0.251]   [0.253]  [0.147] 
Literacy 
content of lab 
market 
  3.124  3.622   3.076  23.871   7.762  13.13 
  [0.947]  [0.867]   [3.597]  [3.371]   [2.910]  [1.967] 
Proportion 
urbanized 
1.539 1.011 1.713 1.115 2.879 2.57 6.973 2.847 2.776 1.659 3.929 1.632 
[0.138] [0.196] 0.128 [0.180] [0.582] [0.795] [0.596] [0.729] [0.414] [0.603] [0.349] [0.425] 
Proportion 
German 
-0.011 -0.051 0.024 -0.005 1.906 1.96 -0.071 -0.511 1.32 1.484 -0.197 -0.482 
[0.104] [0.105] 0.097 [0.096] [0.460] [0.458] [0.469] [0.411] [0.314] [0.324] [0.275] [0.240] 
Constant 
-0.36 -0.641 -0.389 -0.803 0.412 -0.429 -0.812 -2.395 0.781 -1.218 -0.153 -0.805 
[0.079] [0.257] 0.073 [0.235] [0.350] [0.632] [0.348] [0.813] [0.238] [0.789] [0.204] [0.475] 
N 253 253 253 253 273 273 273 273 253 253 273 273 
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.413 0.459 0.508 0.258 0.270   0.348 0.363    
Log-likelihood           -511.368 -473.343     -413.942 -375.759 
Note: Province fixed effects were included in all specifications. Number of observations in columns (i)-(iv) and (ix)-(x) is lower due to the fact that 20 districts in 
provinces of Bukovina and Dalmatia did not report on their schools’ grades and classrooms in 1865 (for private schools, those values can be assumed to have been 
0). Standard errors are reported in square brackets. 
 
